IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

In Re: In the matter of ) the search of UDF, 1301 )
Municipal Way, Grapevine, )
Texas 76051
$\qquad$
CASE NO. 4:21-mc-00016-O
)
. ) NOVEMBER 23, 2021

VOLUME 1 of 1
TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE
BEFORE THE HONORABLE REED C. O'CONNOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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November 23, 2021

OOO

THE COURT: Next case is 4:21-mc-16. Who is here for this case?

MR. PELLETIER: Your Honor, Paul Pelletier. I'm here with Stewart Thomas, local counsel on behalf of UDF. Corporate representative is James Keeney, who is the chief compliance officer with UDF, is also present.

MR. BRASHER: Good afternoon, your Honor. Doug Brasher along with Stephen Fahey.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, you called the meeting. So come on up here and tell me what you want this status conference for.

MR. PELLETIER: Yes, your Honor. We filed a motion, $I$ think it was back in August, asking for the return of all of our privileged documents.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PELLETIER: We had a hearing in October.

October $27 t h$ to be exact. At that hearing, we presented the case to the magistrate. After that hearing, as I'm sure this Court's very aware, the magistrate transferred it to this district and this Court, for whatever this Court wanted to do. I requested a status conference. We're here because the Court set it for hearing on my status conference, and I

thank you for that.

So we're asking for the return of the privileged documents that were seized by the government in September -excuse me, in February of 2018 . The basis for that request is is that we asserted privilege over these documents within about seven days of the search and we were told at that time that the government --

THE COURT: You asserted, you gave them a list of privileged documents --

MR. PELLETIER: Of privilege --

THE COURT: -- asserting privilege over all the terabytes of documents?

MR. PELLETIER: No. No. That's correct. That's correct. All we could do at the time, given that 43 terabytes of information that had been seized.

During that period of time we continued to access our documents at $F B I$ in order to run our business; it was an active, ongoing business. We continued to do that.

In March of 2019, excuse me, January of 2019, we requested from an earlier $41(g)$ in Dallas to actually get back our documents, because we needed to file our financials and continue to run our business by continuing our loan practices. You need original documents for those.

We got back 104 documents on that day. And on the day we filed it, unbeknownst to us, the prosecution team,

AUSA, his name was Nicholas Bunch who is no longer with the office, he went in there and started looking -- we didn't know this at this time -- went in there and started looking through the documents before they had been cleared by the privilege team. Went in and looked at four executives' offices full of documents before the privilege team had cleared it. We were notified of this two days before our hearing on October 27th.

He looked at approximately 130 boxes of documents that had not been cleared for privilege. As a matter of fact, at the time, we didn't know it either, there hadn't been an attorney assigned to the team for more than two years.

So at the hearing we asked for those documents -THE COURT: Let me just stop you there.

MR. PELLETIER: Sure.

THE COURT: Because I've read the docket and I've read the transcript of the hearing. And so I know about the two days before and $I$ know your supplemental briefing.

It seems to me the standoff here is who's going to determine whether these documents are privileged. However many truckloads of documents are not privileged.

MR. PELLETIER: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: And they've done some sort of search with these names, it appears, and they've hit on some number
of documents, and I don't remember the number.

MR. PELLETIER: 7.4 million.

THE COURT: Okay. So some 7.4 million documents are triggered by this list of names that you've given to me. So do you contend that all 7.4 million of those documents, as an officer of the Court, are privileged?

MR. PELLETIER: Oh, I doubt it. I doubt it.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you think they are in a position to determine whether those documents are privileged?

MR. PELLETIER: They are not in a position to determine if those documents --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then, they have those documents, you need to go through those documents and you need to determine which ones are privileged and they need to turn those over to you immediately.

MR. PELLETIER: Well, your Honor, the way it
normally happens --
THE COURT: You don't have to repeat everything that you've said in your writing and everything you've said in the courtroom.

MR. PELLETIER: Okay. Fair enough. There's two sets of documents. There's the electronic documents and then there's the physical documents. All right.

So there's physical documents that have already
been, for lack of a better word, rooted through by the prosecution.

THE COURT: Shouldn't you be asking in this miscellaneous case, is the best way to do it, shouldn't you be asking me to sanction some of these people?

And if it's costing you guys a bunch of money to have to go through these documents because these guys didn't do what they were supposed to do to prevent that from happening, shouldn't these guys have to compensate you for that?

But I find it very difficult that I'm going to ask these guys to look at these documents and determine, since Greenlaw's name is going to be hit on several millions of these documents, to determine which ones of those documents Greenlaw is providing legal advice to versus Greenlaw is engaging in some commercial transaction.

MR. PELLETIER: Greenlaw's name was not on that --

THE COURT: Whomever. Whomever. I don't care
whose name it is. That's just an example.

MR. PELLETIER: I get it. I get it completely.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, don't belabor the record.
If you get it, then don't correct me.

MR. PELLETIER: No. No.

THE COURT: Take into account what I'm saying and then tell me why I'm wrong.

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MR. PELLETIER: I'm not trying to belabor the record.

What I'm trying to say, sanctions? Sure. What form do those sanctions come in?

THE COURT: So about money damages, right?
Whoever, several years ago who didn't follow -- I
know he's new -- but whoever it is who didn't follow this process several years ago, that apparently, according to you and according to the manual, is crystal clear and everybody does it and nobody deviates from it, and everybody tells the magistrate judge, we're going to seize privileged documents, please let us do it and we have this in place.

But whoever didn't do that, clearly didn't do that, why shouldn't they be on the hook for paying whatever consequential damages are coming about for their failure?

MR. PELLETIER: All right.
THE COURT: Now, maybe the law doesn't allow me to do that. I don't know.

MR. PELLETIER: Sanctions come in two forms,
Judge, right?
Sanctions come in one form of monetary, what it's going to cost. And also sanctions come in another form is, if the prosecution did breach the privilege, and we don't know because we haven't seen the stuff yet --

THE COURT: Yes. Yes.

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MR. PELLETIER: So if they have, it has Fifth, Sixth, and Fourth Amendment issues as well. And so, as you know, we have a trial coming up in the very near future, and I don't want to be telling the Court, Judge, we're still looking for the documents to determine what the Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Amendment -- excuse me, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment issues are.

So in order to do that, I think the remedy is different. One, I think because they've waited five years and because the Fifth Circuit says, four years is too long, give them back. I don't want --

THE COURT: But they said give back the documents that you have identified as privileged?

MR. PELLETIER: No.

THE COURT: Well, then why did they draw a distinction between the law office of the Allen Brown case in their opinion?

MR. PELLETIER: Because in this case, what happened --

THE COURT: No. No. No. In that case --

MR. PELLETIER: Yes.

THE COURT: -- in the opinion that you are relying
on.

MR. PELLETIER: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Why did the Fifth Circuit draw a distinction between why the Allen Brown case was different than the Harbor case?

MR. PELLETIER: I think two reasons: One, because the Fifth Circuit, for the first time that I'm aware of, found a privacy -- a constitutional privacy interest in those documents that didn't exist in the case law before.

THE COURT: Well, but for sure one issue is, they said, in the Allen Brown case, they failed to identify privileged documents.

MR. PELLETIER: Uh-huh. Right.

THE COURT: That was a difference between the Allen Brown case and this Harbor case where the claimant identified privileged documents and the government continued to hold those documents. And the Fifth Circuit says, you can't do that. There's too much harm in disregarding the privacy interest in these documents.

MR. PELLETIER: I understand that. There's two sets of privileged documents in the Harbor Health Care case. The one set, if you remember, the court said, let's do a test run -- the district court says, let's do a test run. That test run produced 3,223 emails of which the Harbor Health Care said are privileged.

There were still laptop computers, hard drives, reams -- I think they said 3.7 terabytes of information that still had not been looked at at the time of hearing at the

Fifth Circuit that still had not been evaluated for privilege.

We have the same problem here, Judge, because we've identified -- to the extent that we've looked through 14 boxes of Melissa Youngblood's, we've actually identified privileged documents, and we did that three years ago. They just gave them back last week. We have those.

But the terabytes of the information, we have, as the Court said, we have these seven million documents, and then we have the hundred and whatever number of boxes that are still at the FBI that we know have privileged information in them because they, at least when they looked through it without a taint team, identified some.

There's no way for us to figure out, number one, what those are without actually getting the boxes back and being able to look at them, number one.

And number two, to determine what the infection of the criminal case is, the prosecution team having looked at those privileged documents.

So I think there are two different problems. And I think that in Harbor Health Care, they didn't address, really, what about the 3.5 terabytes -- 3.23 terabytes of information that nobody has looked at yet?

The Court was very clear: Whatever is privileged, give it back. Four years is too long. Again, I agree with
the Court, there's the tension now of inequity, how do we look through 7.5 million that they sat on for five years?

And now the burden is on me while I'm getting ready for a criminal trial to figure out what is privileged and what's not? I know it costs money. And quite frankly, I'm not asking the Court for that sanction.

The sanction is really time. Right? Do I have time to do that to protect my client's interest? And what I would suggest to the Court of those 7.5 million, 7.4 million, just destroy the originals. They don't need them for trial anyway. Just destroy the originals; that solves that problem.

They've given us, last week on October 28, they gave us a hard drive with all those 7.4, I think we're done. If the Court orders them to destroy them, which I don't think they intend on using them anyway, then $I$ think we've solved that problem and we don't have to worry about sanctions or anything like that.

As it relates to the physical documents, I need to look at them. There's two batches. There's about 600 boxes. There's the 140 -- estimate it's about 120, 140 that they actually looked at without a privilege team.

What I would like the Court to do is order them to give those to us so that we can look through them, and I don't have to tell the Court, I didn't have time to do it,
right? Turn those documents over to us.

We will promise that we're not going to destroy anything, but $I$ need to look through them in all due haste to find out what privileged documents they had access to. That's what I would ask the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
Okay. What about these 7.4?
MR. BRASHER: Okay. So I think I need to make a correction. The 7.4 million documents that hit on the UDF supplied search terms, those are on a hard drive. I have five hard drives here, one for each of the four criminal defendants, plus one for UDF. I've offered to return them as of October 28th.

THE COURT: The question though is, are you keeping your own copy or your own version, so the originals?

MR. BRASHER: We do have a copy in our e-discovery platform. And our position all along has been, if UDF will tell us which ones of those are privileged, we will delete those copies so that we don't have any -- any versions of them anymore.

THE COURT: So why do you want do keep them at this point?

It sounds to me, and I take it you're ready to represent to me that your prosecution team has not looked at any of those 7.4, whatever they're called, million documents

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or terabytes, whatever they are.

MR. BRASHER: Correct.

THE COURT: Is that true?

MR. BRASHER: They've never had access until --
THE COURT: As a practical matter, why do you want to keep them?

They're six years in your pocket at this point. MR. BRASHER: Right.

THE COURT: No one has looked at them.
MR. BRASHER: I mean, if the Court were to order us to turn those over right now, we'd be happy to do that.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
MR. BRASHER: If that would solve the problem, we could do that.

THE COURT: 7.4 is off the table. I don't know whose they are, give to whoever is entitled to it, your discs, and then you destroy your 7.4.

All right. Now, where are the 150 boxes of
documents? Roughly 100 to 150 , where are those?
MR. BRASHER: All of the remaining boxes,
whatever -- however Mr. Pelletier has tried to characterize them, they're all in the FBI's possession in Dallas.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BRASHER: We can make them -- they've always been available. Mr. Barrett Howell, who was representing

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UDF in the beginning, came over to the FBI and reviewed them. They are always available. They have always been available. And if counsel wants to come and review those and make additional privilege calls out of those, we will make those available.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRASHER: That's never been a problem. We're willing to do that.

They've also had scans of those materials. I know scans are not perfect, when you get with handwritten documents and other --

THE COURT: The scans that you are talking about are segregated to these particular boxes?

MR. BRASHER: No. The scans of all 750-some-odd boxes.

THE COURT: Right. But he needs to know the 150 that somehow breached, or not really breached, he's saying that it was gone through before there was a taint team.

How would you describe it?

Was there a taint team or not?

MR. BRASHER: There was a taint team for the boxes
that were taken from Melissa Youngblood's, the in-house
counsel's office, those were taken by the taint team and have -- the prosecution team never had access to those boxes
until UDF's counsel, Mr. Howell, came and reviewed those

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The stuff that he essentially cleared, you know, that he didn't claim privilege over, those were provided to the prosecution team. The ones that he tagged as privileged have been returned recently.

THE COURT: Well, you filed a notice two days before the hearing before the magistrate judge in Dallas. And as I read through the notice, you disclosed that you have recently learned that, $I$ guess, AUSA Bunch, and maybe someone else, $I$ don't recall now --

MR. BRASHER: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- had looked through documents that they should not have looked through, because it wasn't cleared by the taint team.

So describe for me, explain for me why you made that notice, and what is the significance of that.

MR. BRASHER: So those boxes, as I understand it, those boxes were documents that were not from Melissa Youngblood's office.

THE COURT: Okay. And so these 100 to 150 boxes that we're talking about is a Melissa Youngblood set?

MR. BRASHER: No.

THE COURT: So then why are you drawing that
distinction?

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MR. BRASHER: Because, as the prosecution team and
AUSA Bunch was only present during one day of the five days, I think that are covered by that notice.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BRASHER: As the prosecution was going through
these boxes, that were from other people's boxes, came
across documents that they thought might be privileged.

Without reviewing them, without looking at them to
make an actual privilege call or reviewing them for
substance, they segregated them and never looked at them again.

The total number of those boxes, $I$ don't know if it's 150 , if that's what we're talking about, I believe that that's that universe.

THE COURT: Okay. So the people who were looking -- the government agents who were looking at that universe of documents --

MR. BRASHER: Right.

THE COURT: -- 100 to 150 boxes your colleague is
suggesting, they looked at it, Bunch did it on one day?

MR. BRASHER: Yes. And then the investigative
agents looked at it on other days.

THE COURT: On other days.

And they, in going through those documents,
realized that they contain -- some of the documents were

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MR. BRASHER: No. Slight nuance. They found
documents, and what's been explained to me as we've interviewed them is, if they came across an attorney's name, Melissa Youngblood's name or any other attorney's name, they immediately segregated it as potentially privileged. They didn't make a privilege call one way or the other on them.

THE COURT: Okay. Just for my benefit, why are they going through as opposed to a taint team, if there was a taint team already in place?

Because your colleague here suggested there was no taint team in place.

MR. BRASHER: There was. I'm not sure I have the reason as to why it was done that way. What's been explained to me is that it was just much easier to use the physical boxes than it was to use the electronic scans of those boxes, where those filter terms would have been applied to them. Just the system was slow and --

THE COURT: But the filter terms being applied, would be applied by a filter team?

MR. BRASHER: Right, to the electronic version.

THE COURT: Right.

And so my question to you though is, why are nonfiltered team individuals then --

MR. BRASHER: Right.

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THE COURT: -- looking at boxes that have not been cleared by the filter team?

MR. BRASHER: I don't have a great answer for that. And that's why I filed that notice was to let the Court know that this has happened.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BRASHER: I don't think that's best practices.

THE COURT: Really?

MR. BRASHER: It doesn't rise to the level of
sanctions or anything like that.

THE COURT: Why is that?

MR. BRASHER: Well, for one, I think UDF counsel had access to those boxes, and he came and was interested in reviewing the boxes from Melissa Youngblood's office, and never made a request to view any of the other boxes.

And this was during a period when those boxes had not been scanned yet for the electronic terms to be applied to them.

THE COURT: So was that UDF's fault that they
hadn't been scanned yet so the filter team could do it?

Did they somehow inhibit the government's ability to get those scanned to submit them to the filter team so that the filter team could then clear or not clear those boxes?

MR. BRASHER: No.

THE COURT: Okay. What's your point in saying they hadn't been scanned yet?

MR. BRASHER: That they were available for review and to make privilege calls on. That's what had happened with Melissa Youngblood's boxes. Mr. Howell came and reviewed these boxes --

THE COURT: So I guess what is confusing me here is you seem to be indicating, at the time that AUSA Bunch and his coagents went through these documents improperly, although you say not intentionally or not sanctionable, that it's UDF's fault that they did so. I don't think I follow you.

MR. BRASHER: Right. I'm not saying it's UDF's fault that that happened.

THE COURT: Or they that tap-dallied somehow that allowed that mistake to occur.

MR. BRASHER: Well, and that's where I think the case law does suggest that -- and that goes, you know, to our waiver argument -- the speed with which and the specificity with which they identify their privilege and assert their privilege.

THE COURT: Well, but if they say, hey, look, you guys have taken privileged documents -- you've taken all of our documents. We have no documents left.

MR. BRASHER: Right.

THE COURT: You've taken them all. We're going to give you a list of names and a list of terms, $I$ don't know what they gave you, some list of things and you run this search, and if any of these documents are alerted because of these terms, you need to put your people on hold until
either you determine that it's privileged or we can get in and see those documents and determine they're privileged.

So I don't understand how that you're just getting around to it. Maybe you are operating on government time, to get around to it, after bankers hours doesn't apply, so you hadn't scanned them.

So Mr. Bunch and his people are like, well, I don't know whose fault this is, but we're going to look at these documents. I don't find that to be waiver at all.

MR. BRASHER: Well, and I would just add that it's the last point, which is, once there's a disagreement as to privilege, how long does the privileger wait to assert --

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. But you haven't even identified -- you haven't even gotten the hits on the 150 boxes to at least segregate out some number of 150 boxes that the trial team should not look at until we determine that they're privileged or not privileged or the other side has been able to make the case to it, that it's privileged or not privileged, or we ask some judge to rule whether it's privileged or not privileged.

As to that 150 boxes, and they have given you the terms to run on that 150 boxes, and your team just hasn't gotten around to it yet. And because your team hasn't gotten around to it yet, your other team is impatient, they want to look at it, I find -- I'll have to look at your briefing more -- but the argument that they have somehow waived the right to allow Mr. Bunch and his agents to go through those boxes seems almost frivolous to me.

MR. BRASHER: The one last thing I can add on that is, $I$ don't know, $I$ was not -- again, not part of the discussions between the government and the parties when it was discussing those filter terms, and $I$ don't know if there was an understanding at the time whether those would be used for the electronic data or for everything, that's a question I don't know the answer to.

THE COURT: Well, who knows then?

MR. BRASHER: Mr. Howell and AUSA Bunch or former AUSA Bunch.

THE COURT: And you have not asked either one of
those?

MR. BRASHER: That precise issue I have not discussed with them.

THE COURT: And why not?

MR. BRASHER: I hadn't focused on it yet.

THE COURT: All right. So you will get rid of

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7.4 million, whatever those are.

And then, as it relates to the 150,100 to 150 boxes, whatever the number is, has the filter team run those documents and gotten hits or not hits?

MR. BRASHER: On the electronic versions, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And so are you able, then, to identify the hits and then pull the hard copies of those documents and segregate those hard copies in the documents?

MR. BRASHER: Am I able to? Yes. But I think I have a better, easier, faster solution, which is I've already instructed the prosecution team, don't access any of the boxes.

If you think you need something for trial that's in a box, you need an original of something you already have, let me know. I will go get the original. So the prosecution team has never had access.

If, in terms of deleting it, the process the court has described is essentially what would have to be done.

THE COURT: Well, it's not just deleting it, though. It sounds as if you have hard copies in a physical box?

MR. BRASHER: Yes.

THE COURT: So you actually have it in two places?

MR. BRASHER: Yes.

THE COURT: And all I'm saying is, if your filter team has run this search and has received hits, what I need you to do is to identify the hits on the electronic version, and I need you to pull the hard copies out of the boxes and segregate those, because those are either clearly privileged or arguably privileged and the balance of them are not.

MR. BRASHER: Well, I think the issue comes -- I would disagree that they're either clearly privileged or likely privileged.

THE COURT: Well, I said arguably.
MR. BRASHER: Arguably. I think that's even going
too far. My point is these have a filter term on them.

THE COURT: These what?

MR. BRASHER: They just have an attorney's name.

Most of the filter terms, if I'm not mistaken, all of them are just attorneys' names or law firm names.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BRASHER: So, you know, for example, if it is an attorney sending a letter or receiving a letter from the SEC, that is not privileged.

THE COURT: I understand. I understand.

MR. BRASHER: And I know there are some of those types of documents in that set.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, it sounds like it's going to be easy.

MR. BRASHER: Well, no --

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THE COURT: I mean, right? If the $S E C$ sends a lawyer from UDF a document, that's clearly not privileged. MR. BRASHER: Yes.

THE COURT: And so why isn't this going to be easy to resolve? Because they are entitled to return privileged documents. So if they are arguably privileged documents, UDF's president sending a letter its law firm, they are entitled to that document back immediately.

MR. BRASHER: Well, I agree. And so the question is, how to do that?

THE COURT: Right.
MR. BRASHER: And --

THE COURT: And we've got a system in place.
You've got a list of names.
MR. BRASHER: Right.
THE COURT: And so run it against the 150 boxes, pull the documents out. You are the head of the taint team, I gather you get to look at it. And if it is the CEO of this company writing to his law firm about legal matters, you will know and you put it aside.

If you don't know, you can ask them. And if you can't agree at that point, then you could ask me to look at it.

MR. BRASHER: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't understand why we can't do
this.

MR. BRASHER: I misunderstood the Court. I thought the Court was saying anything that hit on the search terms would just be returned.

THE COURT: No. Huh-uh.

MR. BRASHER: Okay.

THE COURT: No. They are entitled to privileged documents, at this point, immediately. And so you need to put in place, probably either you or your team, you need to put in place a process, once you get rid of the 7.4 , put in a process as its relates to these 150 boxes to cull out those that get hit and review those documents and determine if they're privileged or not privileged.

And then, if they are privileged, they need to be returned. If there's an argument about a privilege, and you can't reach an agreement, then you need to ask me to make the call.

MR. BRASHER: And I have two issues that I need to address with that. First is the sequence. I need to be able to retain our copy of the electronic documents so that I can know what hit the terms to know what to go look for in the boxes. So $I$ can't delete my 7.4 until $I$ do that.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BRASHER: The second is the question the Court started with, which is, whose burden is it?

THE COURT: This is what $I$ want you to do.

MR. BRASHER: I understand.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand the back-and-forth
that you all have done in the papers and in your last hearing. This is what $I$ want you to do.

MR. BRASHER: Understood. As long as I can clarify that you want me to do that, despite the fact that Mr. Pelletier doesn't want me to do that?

THE COURT: I want you, as head of the taint team, to in this segment of documents that he's talking about that he's very concerned about given the time crunch --

MR. BRASHER: Right.

THE COURT: -- I want you to take a list of the documents that have been triggered by your search protocols, and then $I$ want you to pull the hard copies of those documents, and $I$ want you to determine whether they're privileged or not privileged. Obviously privileged or not privileged.

If they're obviously privileged, I want you to return those documents to your colleague. And then let him know what you don't believe is privileged and why. And then if you all can't reach an agreement on that, then you or they ask me to review them.

MR. BRASHER: Okay. And then, once that's done, then we can delete the electronic versions of the 7.4.

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THE COURT: Yes. I mean, once that's done, if they are not privileged --

MR. BRASHER: Yes.

THE COURT: -- then these cases about the danger of you holding privileged documents too long don't apply. So then you just fall under normal search warrant protocols.

MR. BRASHER: Right. Okay.
THE COURT: Now, they have asked you to preserve any communication Mr. Bunch has had with Kyle Bass or this Hayman Group and that sort of thing. Have you done that? MR. BRASHER: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And where are those?

MR. BRASHER: We have them in a database. I don't
know where the server is actually located, but they're in electronic form in our office.

THE COURT: And what is the quantity of documents in that universe?

MR. BRASHER: I don't know. I would have to look and update the Court on that.

THE COURT: Well, update me on that.

MR. BRASHER: That's just communications between AUSA Bunch and Bass and his group?

THE COURT: Bass, Hayman, or about Bass and
Hayman.
MR. BRASHER: Or about?

THE COURT: That's what the preservation letter said. Okay?

MR. BRASHER: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. What else?

MR. PELLETIER: Thank you, your Honor. May I suggest something maybe, maybe easier? The court may not think so, but $I$ think it's easier.

A lot of the documents that were scanned, that they attempted to scan, they didn't scan. And there's a declaration in there from a witness who reviewed it. And there's a lot of documents that weren't scanned, original documents.

I think it might be easier with these, 100 and whatever boxes, for us to be given access to them at UDF, promising to not destroy anything, to actually be able to go through them ourselves to identify what's privileged. I think if there's an argument, no, then we could do it that way.

The other problem that that solves is, as the Fifth Circuit said, and I think other circuits have said, it's the taint team actually reviewing documents and making a determination as to what is privileged is a difficult thing.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. PELLETIER: Some circuits --

THE COURT: And you all went back and forth before the magistrate judge on that.

MR. PELLETIER: Right. So I would prefer, and I think the law prefers them not to make it privileged to you, if there is a battle. I really don't think there's going to be a battle, Judge, on that.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PELLETIER: So I think the easier thing is, as an officer of this Court, to take custody of these boxes that they've identified. It's a specific number. It's the documents in his file, FBI 302 list.

If they can make them available to us, it will save a lot of time on everybody's part. We will look through them. They have copies of the nonprivileged stuff anyway. So we're not going to have an evidentiary per se if something is missing, but $I$ would prefer we make that call.

Again, we will give it to them or the Court and say, it's not privileged, it is privileged. They can say that. But that's not really why we're doing the exercise anyway. Obviously, we want to get our privileged stuff back, but the privilege determination is not really what's critical here.

THE COURT: Well, it is critical as relates to Rule 41, though.

MR. PELLETIER: Yeah. Yeah. For sure. For sure.

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The time is what's critical to me.
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THE COURT: I understand. But you have the boxes, you have those documents.

MR. PELLETIER: We have a scanned copy of some of them.

THE COURT: Okay. But they've been available to you?

MR. PELLETIER: Oh, sure. And to the extent you can search them --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PELLETIER: -- it's an extremely
time-consuming process. I will tell the Court that these are documents -- this isn't just to Joe Blow attorney, that kind of privilege. It's our defense in this case -- not in this case, in the underlying criminal case. And there are many documents like that of which I have attached to one of my pleadings that's ex parte, under seal.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PELLETIER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, how long is this -- the process

I have outlined, how long will that take? A week?

MR. BRASHER: Your Honor, I was just discussing with Mr. Fahey how many people we can throw at this and we will do this as expeditiously as we can. It's hard for me to commit until I --

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THE COURT: Get it done by next Friday. And then, once that is done, once you have done that, is there any reason why you could not give them these hard copies?

MR. BRASHER: Of the ones that we admit are privileged?

THE COURT: No. No. No. All of them.
MR. BRASHER: Or -- no?

THE COURT: The universe of the hard copies in the boxes. Right?

You've got hard copies of these documents in 100
to 150 boxes somewhere?
MR. BRASHER: Right.
THE COURT: And you've got them scanned on your
server?
MR. BRASHER: (Nods head.)
THE COURT: And so you're going to get the hits off the server and you're going to go and you're going to pull the actual documents out of the box?

MR. BRASHER: (Nods head.)
THE COURT: And that's going to be some smaller
universe of documents, and then you guys are going to resolve these issues.

MR. BRASHER: Right.
THE COURT: And all I'm asking is, once that is done, the full universe of the boxes, wherever they are, is there any reason why you could not then give them back to your colleague?

MR. BRASHER: Yes. I believe because they were seized validly pursuant to a search warrant and the government is using those in an active criminal case.

THE COURT: So they are using those?

MR. BRASHER: Are we still talking about the 150?

THE COURT: The 150 , yes.

MR. BRASHER: Yes, they are.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I'll have to think about that.

But meanwhile, we'll get the privileged, do this, get it done by next Friday. Any documents that are clearly privileged need to be returned immediately.

And any documents that there's an argument over, you can ask me to look at them, and I will get it done. And then I will think further about the hard copies.

MR. BRASHER: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. What else?

MR. PELLETIER: Your Honor, Happy Thanksgiving.

THE COURT: Oh, yes. Thank you. Thank you, all
of you.

What else?

MR. BRASHER: Nothing else, your Honor. I don't have anything else.

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THE COURT: Nothing?
Okay. We're in recess. Thank you.
(The proceedings concluded at 2:42 p.m.)

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
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the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from
the record of proceedings in the foregoing entitled
matter to the best of my ability to hear.
Further, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, some
participants are wearing masks, and/or appeared via
videoconferencing, so proceedings were transcribed to the
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I further certify that the transcript fees format
comply with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
Signed this 26 th day of November, 2021.
___/s/ Zoie Williams______
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[^0]:    Zoie Williams, RMR, RDR, FCRR

